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European Economic Diplomacy: What Role for the 
EIB? 
Balazs Ujvari 
Led by the European Commission and the 
European External Action Service, 
European economic diplomacy is in the 
making. This exercise requires a 
strengthened co-ordination not only 
between the EU and its member states but 
also with the European Investment Bank 
(EIB) as pointed out by the Commission’s 
recently published ‘Reflection Paper on 
Harnessing Globalisation’. The EIB, the 
largest non-sovereign lender and borrower 
in the world which dedicates around 10% 
of its annual lending volume to operations 
outside the EU, indeed appears to have 
several ways to back the evolving 
European economic diplomacy. This 
policy brief is set out to explore some.     
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and the European External Action Service 
(which has also appointed dedicated senior 
advisors to economic diplomacy issues) has led 
the work on the matter over the course of the 
past year.  
 
Most recently, the „Reflection Paper on 
Harnessing Globalisation‟ published by the 
European Commission on 10 May  suggested 
that „the EU and Member States should 
improve the coherence of external policies and 
tools to foster growth and jobs in Europe and 
become more efficient in pursuing our 
economic interests abroad.‟ Interestingly, the 
document places the emphasis on the pursuit 
of the EU‟s economic interests, while 
somewhat relegating the link between 
economic diplomacy and traditional foreign 
policy objectives towards third countries. In 
other words, European economic diplomacy 
has not, thus far, been framed so much in 
terms of economic statecraft where economic 
means, such as foreign aid, trade or policies 
governing the international flow of capital, are 
used as foreign policy tools. As such, the 
primary goal of European economic 
diplomacy is not to pursue concrete foreign 
policy agendas such as strengthening the 
constitutional state and governance in Tunisia 
or advancing normalisation in Turkey-Cyprus 
relations, for example.  Instead, European 
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Since the priorities of the European Union 
Global Strategy (EUGS) were endorsed by EU 
heads of state and government in June 2016, 
considerable efforts have been undertaken by 
the EU institutions to develop a coordinated 
and coherent European approach to economic 
diplomacy. A genuine European economic 
diplomacy consists of a collection of strategies 
and actions of the EU member states (which 
have been growing in importance in the recent 
years) and a distinct EU element that 
complements these efforts in this this area.1 It 
is in this spirit that the European Commission 
and the European External Action Service 
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economic diplomacy is, in addition to boosting 
growth and jobs, mainly intended to further 
some generic, cross-cutting EU foreign policy 
principles such as strengthening international 
rules and standards on issues like human 
rights, working conditions, food safety, public 
health, environmental protection or the 
sustainable development goals (SDGs). 
 
In delivering a European economic diplomacy, 
suggests the above Reflection Paper, a 
systemic and strengthened co-ordination 
between the EU, the member states and the 
European Investment Bank (EIB) is 
imperative. But how exactly can this latter 
contribute to a European economic 
diplomacy? This policy brief explores this 
question by identifying ways in which the EIB 
can weigh into the formulation and 
implementation of a European economic 
diplomacy.   
 
EIB – AN OVERLOOKED (F)ACTOR? 
In general, the Luxembourg-based institution 
has received rather limited attention in the 
context of EU relations with third countries. 
Yet, the fact remains that, founded in 1958 
under the Treaty of Rome, the EIB is the 
largest non-sovereign borrower and lender in 
the world. In addition to the 28 EU member 
states, it operates in some 160 countries 
worldwide. During 2016, the total value of 
operations signed by the EIB group – which 
also includes the European Investment Fund 
(EIF) – reached EUR 83.75 billion (bn), of 
which EUR 8.04bn concerned countries 
outside the EU.  This latter figure puts the 
EIB on a par with the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), 
the total annual investment of which had 
reached 9.4bn in the same year.2 When 
operating outside the EU, the EIB relies on 
three main instruments: the External Lending 
Mandate (ELM), the ACP-EU Cotonou 
Mandate, and its Own Risk Facilities (ORF). 
The ELM is mostly used in pre-accession and 
 neighbourhood countries with a low 
investment-grade as well as in Asia and Latin 
America but also South Africa. In African, 
Caribbean and Pacific countries the Bank 
operates through the Cotonou Mandate 
whereas the ORFs are primarily mobilised for 
operations in countries with a high investment-
grade.  
 
Through its activities outside the Union, the 
EIB seeks to contribute to EU external action 
by supporting the major regional policy 
frameworks, including enlargement, 
neighbourhood and development co-operation 
policies with the following main objectives: 
local private sector development and economic 
and social infrastructure, with climate action 
and regional integration as a cross-cutting 
objective.  While lending is by far the EIB‟s 
principal activity, the bank also provides 
financing via equity investments and other 
instruments. Technical assistance and advisory 
services are also provided in order to enhance 
the preparation and quality of the projects 
funded. 
 
With regards to shifting global priorities and 
the adoption of the 2030 Sustainable 
Development Agenda, the global climate deal 
struck at the 21st Conference of Parties in 
Paris and the persisting migration crisis in 
particular, there appears to be an increasing 
interest in, and demand for, the types of 
products and core expertise that multilateral 
development banks like the EIB can offer. 
This seems to present more of an opportunity, 
than in the past, for the bank to be recognised 
as a relevant (f)actor in EU external action, 
including in terms of European economic 
diplomacy. 
 
EIB AND EUROPEAN ECONOMIC 
DIPLOMACY 
The EIB‟s 2017-2019 operational plan 
underlines that the bank seeks to make a 
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contribution to European economic 
diplomacy, particularly by means of increased 
use of its ORFs. In its ELM mid-term 
evaluation report to the Council and the EP, 
the Commission notes that the EIB is expected 
to be a key player in supporting EU enterprises 
who want to do business abroad, which is one 
of the crucial objectives of European 
economic diplomacy.3 Arguably, the bank is 
well-equipped to support the 
internationalisation of EU businesses in 
multiple ways. Firstly, the EIB finances 
innovation and skills within the EU. In 
addition to ensuring sustainable growth and 
creating high-value jobs, this also contributes 
to improving the long-term competitiveness of 
EU enterprises in a global context which can 
facilitate their entry into, and position on, 
foreign markets.   
 
Secondly, the institution also provides direct 
financing in support of the outward and cross-
border investments of EU companies. 
Recently, most such EIB activities have 
focused on the Mediterranean region (e.g. 
EUR 10m for Spanish EUROPAC Group in 
2015 to support its growth on the Moroccan 
market).  More notable, however, is the lack of 
FDI support operations towards Asia in the 
last years. Yet, as per the EUGS, Asia is the 
very region towards which the EU most 
crucially needs to build up a robust economic 
diplomacy. With regards to China, in particular, 
the strategy emphasises the need for a level 
playing field, allowing EU investors to gain a 
greater presence on the Chinese market and to 
be treated on equal terms with domestic actors.  
The fact that the EIB mainly operates through 
ORFs in the country may come in handy in 
this respect, given that this is currently the only 
channel of EIB external lending that allows for 
direct FDI support. Nevertheless, in line with 
the growing expectations towards the bank in 
terms of FDI financing, the question also arises 
as to whether or not the EIB should be 
(re)authorised to specifically support cross-
border and outward investments under the 
ELM, as was the case with former mandates. 
Thirdly, the EIB also enhances opportunities 
for EU companies to participate in projects 
outside the EU as suppliers or contractors, 
while also supporting working capital facilities 
in favour of small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) and mid-caps active in 
commerce inside and outside the EU.  Lastly, 
despite the short-term repayment conditions 
relating to such activities, the institution has, in 
recent years, also developed tools to promote 
foreign trade by European SMEs, including 
through dedicated trade finance  (e.g. EIB 
Trade Finance Facility for Greece created in 
2013) and export credit facilities  (e.g. €50mn 
facility with Northstar Luxembourg for buyer 
credit financing signed in late 2015). The EIB 
also partners with other institutions on similar 
schemes: an example of which is the EIB-
Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) 
Joint Initiative to support investments from 
Latin American SMEs and mid-caps in the EU 
and vice versa. 
 
Nonetheless, the EIB‟s potential in 
underpinning European economic diplomacy 
goes much beyond the internationalisation of 
EU businesses. The significant financing 
provided by the institution to several countries 
outside the EU, notably those in the 
neighbourhood and the Western Balkans, also 
makes the case for a more strategic 
consideration of the EIB factor when EU 
foreign policy objectives are pursued vis-à-vis 
third countries.  In addition to serving 
beneficiary countries‟ interests, the financing 
made available by the bank furthers, to a 
varying degree, the EU‟s own strategic interests 
too. Examples include the financing of energy 
projects that help to assure adequate energy  
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supply towards Europe; the undertaking of 
climate projects to help decarbonise some of the 
largest polluting economies such as China; and 
the boosting of resilience in countries affected 
most by migratory pressures (either as origin or 
transit countries).  Therefore, if European 
economic diplomacy were to be linked to the 
pursuit of broader strategic interests (instead of 
focusing narrowly on growth and jobs), the EIB 
could still act as an additional lever of influence 
through its financing operations as it contributes 
to the EU‟s visibility outside the bloc and 
magnifies the Union‟s – financial – offer in the 
eyes of third countries. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, while the EIB has several tools to 
pursue economic diplomacy activities notably 
through supporting the internationalisation of 
EU business, operations serving this objective 
have only constituted a minor portion of the 
bank‟s lending portfolio in the recent years. In  
 
 
addition, most such operations of the bank have 
focused on the southern neighbourhood of late, 
whereas the EUGS champions economic 
diplomacy considerations primarily in the 
context of EU-Asia relations. Therefore, for the 
EIB to play a greater role in European economic 
diplomacy in tune with the EUGS, it will be 
imperative to enhance and reorient its pertinent 
activities towards Asia, with a particular 
emphasis on China and India. Doing so 
successfully will also allow the bank to gain a 
greater acknowledgement for its role in 
implementing the principles of EU external 
action and the objectives laid down in EU 
regional policy frameworks, potentially also 
consolidating its emerging recognition as an 
additional lever of influence in EU external 
relations. 
 
Balazs Ujvari is a Joint Research Fellow at 
Egmont – The Royal Institute for 
International Relations and the European 
Policy Centre. 
 5 
 
 
Endnotes 
1 Okano-Heijmans, Maaike and Montesano, Francesco Saverio (April 2016), Who is Afraid of European 
Economic Diplomacy?, Policy Brief, Clingendael. 
2 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (May 2017), Annual Report 2016. Available at: 
http://www.ebrd.com/news/publications/annual-report/annual-report-2016.html 
3 European Commission (14 September 2017), Report from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council, COM(2016) 584 final, Brussels, p. 8. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
